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 Let me say at the outset how delighted I am
to be sandwiched between two “New
Macroeconomists” Torben Andersen and
Steinar Holden, both of whose work I admire.
I myself am an “old style” macroeconomist,
who was brought up on Keynes’s General
Theory (1936), which I notice is no longer
on graduate macro reading lists at prominent
universities. During my years at the IMF the
staple was the IMF’s monetary model
developed by Polak (1956), which also does
not feature on these reading lists. This I find
quite baffling in view of the defining
contributions of these frameworks for the
conduct of macroeconomic stabilization
policy around the globe for more than fifty
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something on the lines that they lack rigorous
micro-foundations.
But is the quest for increased rigour in
the form of sharply defined micro-founda-
tions appropriate, and especially when dealing
with stabilization problems in real time? I shall
argue that the emphasis on this kind of rigour
is misplaced. Not only does it account for
much of the disconnect between current
academic research on macro stabilization and
the way governments and international
organizations actually practice it, but it might
even encourage potentially destabilizing
structural reforms. While the academic
research is in many respects exciting, I do not
believe it has so far succeeded in developing
effective substitutes for reasons I shall explain.
There is, moreover, a lamentable consequence
of current academic disenchantment with
earlier frameworks in that it discourages
research on preserving and improving them.
This fate may be appropriate for large-scale
Tinbergen type Keynesian models that Lucas
(1976) critiqued with devastating effect, not
to forget that Keynes also critiqued them, but
I shall argue this is not so for the sort of models
that Keynes (1936) himself espoused, or those
that Frisch considered later in his career. The
result of the disenchantment with the old and
the lack of effective new substitutes is that
practical policy making becomes increasingly
ad hoc, with greater scope for confusion. This
leads to inefficient economic management,
which I claim is evidenced by the widespread
economic crises of the past two decades
around the globe, and the progressive build-
up of the IMF’s casualty case list. When theory
does not support practical work and practical
needs do not inspire theory, we are clearly at
an impasse: the key issue then is how to break
out of it. In my deliberately provocative
remarks I will indicate some of the enduring
concerns of macroeconomics, as I see them,
and the extent to which the new macro-
economics does or does not address them;
lament the fundamental disconnects between
macro practice and current theory and suggest
ways for overcoming them. Finally, I will stick
my neck out and indicate, as requested by the
conveners of this conference, probable
outcomes of the fundamental disconnect. 
What is macroeconomics about?
It is useful to begin with a reminder of the
basic wants of individuals and then to examine
their macroeconomic manifestations. The
first column in Table 1 lists six basic individual
wants that motivate individual behaviour in
the economic area. These involve various
aspects of income such as its amount and its
purchasing power that are needed for
sustained well-being. The second column
identifies the macro correlates that correspond
to them. Consider the first item: all
individuals presumably will want jobs that
will generate some income. From time to time
some individuals will lose jobs and/or
incomes. Is this an idiosyncratic event that
washes out in the aggregate? Or is there a
macroeconomic manifestation of unemploy-
ment and loss of income? If the phenomenon
is macroeconomic what influences its
variation? Can some form of public policy
intervention ensure a more satisfactory
outcome? Similar questions can be raised
about each of the other items. For example,
the individual would also be concerned about
income retaining purchasing power. This is
affected by the macroeconomic phenomena
of inflation and exchange rate changes. What
explains their variation, how can they be
influenced? And so forth.
Answers to such questions determine
whether there is anything distinctive about
macroeconomics. In the Anglo-Saxon tradi-
tion, the systematic study of macroeconomics
12 Sheetal K. Chand
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Theory (1936), where he argued that certain
phenomena could not be handled through
mere aggregation of individual behaviour and
Walrasian market coordination.
1
He questioned the relevance of classical
theory both for understanding macro
phenomena such as unemployment and for
developing solutions. Keynes argued that
interaction between agents who differed with
respect to endowments, preferences, expec-
tations, access to information, psychological
states and so forth can generate purely
macroeconomic problems. The market,
although a wonderful mechanism, would
from time to time fail to coordinate the
interactions of myriads of individuals.
Classical economists, who had correctly
pointed out the huge benefits from social
interaction and specialization, paid in-
sufficient attention to the price tag: the
individual’s loss of control to macroeconomic
developments. However much the individual
may want job and income, and old-age
insurance, macroeconomic circumstances
may deny them. Frisch in the 1930’s
considered the case where an economic
depression originated from one set of agents
not daring to buy the other agents’ goods,
because they feared they would not be able to
sell them later on (referred to in Andvig,
1988). “Involuntary unemployment” to use
Keynes’s unfortunate phraseology, would be
another example of Frisch’s concern.2  What is
meant here is excessive unemployment that
arises when labour is willing to work at
prevailing or even lower wages but firms are
not willing to hire, because they are uncertain
that they will be able to sell the extra output
produced. This is a chicken and egg problem.
If more workers are hired they would increase
total demand and firms as a group would
benefit: therefore, they should be willing to
hire more labour. However, each firm is
Macroeconomics – which way now? Old versus new styles 13
1. Some go back to Irving Fisher. However, Frisch accorded the distinction of inventing macroeconomics to Wick-
sell.
2. Haavelmo (1950) questioned the use of this terminology arguing that involuntary outcomes are not a within
system property, since all outcomes there would be the result of voluntary actions. They emerge on comparison
with the outcomes generated under alternative systems, for example, the neoclassical system as comparator. 
Table 1.
Individual Wants and Their Macroeconomic Correlates
Individual wants
• Want  job/income
•  Want income to have purchasing power
•  Want income to increase
•  Want purchasing power parity with neighbour
•  Want income when unable to work
Macro correlates
• Unemployment
• Inflation/exchange  rate
• Productivity/growth
• Income/wealth  distribution
• Social  insurance
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same way. To break the coordination
bottleneck Keynes suggested measures that
add to aggregate demand. 
Of course, if each agent is omniscient and
has faith that others are also omniscient and
would not take advantage of a faith-based
decision of his own, interaction need not
generate macro phenomena such as un-
employment. But the facts indicate otherwise.
Typically, agents are myopic, information
constrained, and beset with uncertainties. As
the history of economic crises amply
illustrates, sole reliance on the decentralized
responses of individuals may not be sufficient
to bring about desirable outcomes. When
different individuals interact they unleash
dynamic processes that are likely to be path
dependant. Some of the equilibria that the
dynamic processes generate are undesirable,
and deliberate coordination may be needed to
escape them. That destabilization has not been
more pervasive points to the critical role
underlying institutions and constraints have
played in restraining and influencing
potentially destabilizing human behaviour.
What is the nature of these institutions and
how do they emerge and evolve? I shall come
back to this issue later.
It would be nice if we could pin down
each individual’s behaviour in a convenient
formula, aggregate them so as to determine
macro level excess demands and supplies, and
then in a proper dynamic framework show
how macro phenomena arise. This ideal has
yet to be attained for reasons that I will now
go over.
What sort of micro foundations:
Behaviouralism or neoclassical
rationalism?
Consider first the issue of how to characterise
individual behaviour. A reasonable postulate
is that individuals act as best as they can to
satisfy the various wants listed in Table 1. They
interact with others who are similarly
motivated in an environment fraught with
uncertainties. The economy is frequently
exposed to shocks, and different individuals
will perceive and respond to them differently.
The psychological state of the individual,
whether depressed or optimistic, calm or
anxious, etc, will also be relevant. The precise
nature of the decision taken is therefore a
highly complex matter. Some of the key
factors influencing the decision-making
process are summarized in Table 2. Under the
column head “the real world” is a listing, based
on introspection and the findings of
behavioural psychologists, of influential
factors that are likely to apply.3 The second
column itemizes the corresponding treatment
in rationalist, neoclassical, theories. The third
column is culled from Keynes’s General
Theory. 
The neoclassical micro-foundations
approach is distinctive. It embeds in a macro
framework the notion of the individual as a
rational calculating utility maximizer with full
knowledge of the relevant stochastic processes.
The result is a macro theory that is entirely
driven by the micro postulates, effectively
reducing macroeconomics to a branch of
microeconomics. For example, a macro
economy comprising neoclassical utility
maximizers with rational expectations and full
information will not engage in any real
adjustments in response to an anticipated
14 Sheetal K. Chand
3. See, for example, Gilad and Kaish (1986).
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4 The
logic of the model is incontrovertible, but in
the real world agents do not fulfil these
assumptions. Even if the increase in aggregate
demand is pre-announced, agent responses
may vary if only because of different degrees
of belief in the announcement.5 The ensuing
dynamic processes are more likely to be on
the lines Hume wrote more than two centuries
ago of an increase in treasure quickening the
pace of economic activity. Both output and
prices would tend to rise initially before
output eventually reverts to its former level,
and the price level has fully adjusted to absorb
the expansionary impulse. 
Several ingenious attempts have been
made to reconcile the unrealistic macro-
economic implications of neoclassical micro-
foundations with the facts, usually through
introducing a deus ex machina. Lucas (1972)
argues that nominal demand shocks will cause
output movements because agents confound
a general price increase for a relative price
change. Given the extensive media coverage
of macroeconomic issues, this is difficult to
justify. Fischer (1977) and Phelps-Taylor
(1977) introduce frictions through ad hoc
specifications of wage-setting behaviour.
Agents adjust prices or wages at set regular
intervals. This assumption conveniently
facilitates analysis, but is it realistic?  What is
noteworthy about these attempts is their
insistence on using the neoclassical micro
foundations approach for positive analysis.
But that objective may be questionable, and
the several attempts to explain anomalies
between neoclassical theory in a positive mode
and reality are reminiscent of Ptolemaic patch-
ups. The Copernician alternative would be to
fundamentally reformulate the theory, which
is precisely what Keynes had attempted with
his behavioural psychology interpretation.
Unfortunately, it has not yet been possible to
properly formalize this more realistic
conception, but there is promising ongoing
work (see the review in Rabin, 1998).
Contrary to Keynes’s emphasis on realism
all the way, Friedman (1953) argued in an
influential methodological contribution that
realism in assumptions is unnecessary for the
purpose of generating testable propositions
and predictions. As long as these survived
rigorous empirical testing, the theory was
good and it did not matter that it was derived
from idealized assumptions that were divorced
from reality. However, Keynes would have
rejected Friedman’s positive methodology for
not recognising the distinctive nature of
macroeconomics as a social and moral science
that prevents it from generating successful
predictions on a par with the natural 
sciences.
6
Keynes states (1938), “The object of
statistical analysis is not so much to fill in
missing variables with a view to prediction, as
to test the relevance and validity of the
model.” This position accords with the
dominant view in the philosophy of science
that a central purpose of science is to provide
satisfactory causal explanations that are
supported by good predictions rather than
focussing solely on the latter. Philosophers of
Macroeconomics – which way now? Old versus new styles 15
4. See Lucas (1972).
5. Johansen (1982) pointed out with respect to investment behaviour, “… if investors hold different anticipations
about the future, then total investment may turn out to be very different from the case in which all investors
hold the same anticipations, and the reactions to changes in policy instruments may be very different.”
6. Hendry (2000) draws a useful sharp distinction between prediction, which he regards as inappropriate for a sub-
ject like economics but not for science, and forecasting, which can be undertaken in any number of ways and
need not be tied to specific theories as with predictions.
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Friedman’s methodology.7
Perhaps the most glaring drawback for
Friedman’s approach is that the predictions
that were supposed to validate the method
have been singularly unsuccessful. Macro-
economics, whether of the Monetarist,
Keynesian, Real Business Cycle or some other
variety, does not predict well, and certainly
not with the precision of the natural sciences,
and sometimes can be terribly wrong.8 This
reflects a fundamental difference between the
social and natural sciences, which Keynes
adverted to in his insistence that economics is
a moral science, and which Frisch later
appeared to endorse in his decision models.
Different criteria need to be applied when
gauging success in economics than in, say,
physics. Good economics like good physics
requires satisfactory causal explanations, but
whereas success in physics would be based on
prediction validations, in economics it should
be judged by the ability of its prescriptions to
improve actual economic outcomes. 
Rigorous micro foundations
continued: The aggregation problem 
A key issue in modelling the macro economy
is how to aggregate the diverse behaviour of
16 Sheetal K. Chand
Table 2. 
Individual’s decision making process: alternative formulations 
The real world
• Psychological  state
• Social  influences
• Uncertainty
• Limited  information



















7. See Hausman (2001).
8. However, some macro theories perform better than others, for example, Friedman’s and Phelp’s development of
the expectations augmented Phillips curve. The aim should still be to get the one that describes, explains and
predicts the best. 
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rigorous micro foundation usually adopt a
representative agent approach.  Kirman
(1992) critically evaluates this procedure, and
it is worth summarizing some of his main
arguments regarding the conditions under
which an agent can and cannot legitimately
represent a collection of individuals. To begin
with an aggregate of individuals cannot act
like a single individual maximizer, nor does
individual maximization engender collective
rationality. But even overlooking this aspect,
it is generally invalid to assume that the
reaction of the representative individual to
some change will be the same as that of the
group that he or she represents. The
representative’s preference ordering between
different choices is also unlikely to be
reproduced by all of the individuals
represented. This effectively rules out the use
of the representative agent’s preferences as a
basis for deciding whether one situation is
better than another. Since the scope for
providing welfare comparisons is often
presented as a major justification for the
rigorous micro foundations approach, this
criticism is quite devastating. 
Kirman finds that the only way to salvage
the representative agent model is to assume that
all individuals are identical in every respect. But
then, as he points out, there can be no competing
wants and no basis for trade. This shuts out most
of the macroeconomic problems listed in Table
1. A paradox is thus generated. Either the
representative agent is not representative, or all
agents are identical in which case there is no
need for macroeconomics.
Given the problems with aggregation and
the difficulty in formalizing a realistic view of
the individual, it is natural to ask whether we
could do without micro foundations. Why
not simply focus on macro aspects? When the
early astronomers wanted to explain the
motions of the planetary system, they studied
the planets themselves and not the atoms from
which they are composed. Had the research
strategy insisted on full micro-foundations at
the outset, the gravitational forces influencing
planetary motion would probably have been
discovered much later, since their effects at
the atomic level are miniscule. 
But economics is quite different from
astronomy. It does not deal with physical
objects that are out there waiting to be
discovered if only sufficiently powerful
instruments were available. The objects of
macro analysis are derived concepts such as
national income, consumption and invest-
ment. They are categories that represent the
activities of myriads of individuals, and are
related to each other through identities
generated by a consistent accounting
framework. The macroeconomic identities
result from the aggregation of similar
identities that concern the behaviour of each
of the myriad agents. Some understanding of
micro behaviour therefore is vital and the
aggregation problem has to be squarely faced. 
However, the extremely restrictive
representative agent construction is not
required to derive “nice” properties such as
downward sloping demand functions and
stable equilibria at the macroeconomic level.
Kirman reviews some fascinating research that
shows that agent heterogeneity can under
broad conditions be compatible with nice
macro properties. His conclusions are
appropriate (1992, p.134), “…the fact that
behaviour at the macroeconomic level exhibits
regularities does not mean that it is useful or
appropriate to treat the economy as a
maximizing representative individual.” 
Keynes, the Tinbergen approach,
and the Lucas critique
Before addressing the issue of how best to
undertake macro analysis, it is important to
Macroeconomics – which way now? Old versus new styles 17
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relations. The desire for formalization and
fascination of economists with the natural
science model led to a seemingly innocent re-
interpretation of Keynes so as to fit his theories
into a more scientific mould. On the
theoretical front Hicks (1937) contributed
the IS/LM framework, which Keynes was
apparently not at all enthusiastic about, but
which became a macro theory staple for several
decades. Unfortunately, IS/LM, and its
subsequent reincarnation as the so-called
neoclassical synthesis, trivialized Keynes’s
contribution. Mathematically, it reduced it to
the introduction of an over-determinacy in
the standard Walrasian framework that
resulted from fixing nominal prices. This puts
the burden of equilibration on quantitative
adjustment, which was widely construed as
the central contribution of Keynes’s macro-
economic theory. But this way of looking at it
completely obscures the central roles played
in Keynes’s theory of uncertainty, of the
behaviour of heterogeneous agents and their
interactions, and the resulting coordination
problems. 
On the empirical front, Frisch and
Tinbergen had developed an approach which
was highly influential for several decades, but
which Keynes regarded poorly from the
outset, as did Frisch subsequently. The
Frisch-Tinbergen approach, with IS/LM
providing the key theoretical underpinning,
consisted of specifying structural, or cause
and effect, relations to explain human
behaviour in the aggregate, for example a
function to explain aggregate private
consumption, another for private investment
and so forth. These were estimated using
econometric techniques that were developed
in tandem, especially at the Cowles
Commission, and to which Haavelmo made
fundamental contributions. Models
estimated on these lines were widely used for
making predictions and for evaluating the
effects of alternative policies. 
Keynes especially objected to the
Tinbergen approach as being psuedo-science.
It is worth quoting in some detail Keynes’s
(1938) remarks in a letter to Roy Harrod, “I
think we are a little bit at cross purposes….
My point against Tinbergen is a different one.
In chemistry and physics and other natural
sciences the object of experiment is to fill in
the actual values of the various quantities and
factors appearing in an equation or a formula;
and the work when done is once and for all.
In economics that is not the case…Tinbergen
endeavours to work out the variable quantities
in a particular case, or perhaps in the average
of several particular cases, and he then suggests
that the quantitative formula so obtained has
general validity. Yet in fact, by filling in figures,
which one can be sure will not apply next
time, so far from increasing the value of his
instrument, he has destroyed it…. The psuedo-
analogy with the physical sciences leads directly
counter to the habit of mind which is most
important for an economist proper to acquire.”
(Italics added)
Despite Keynes’s critique, the Frisch-
Tinbergen approach, which ironically came
to be relabelled the Keynesian approach, was
widely employed. It was not until its
spectacular failure to account for the stag-
flation in the mid-seventies, providing natural
fodder for the Lucas (1976) critique, that the
approach fell out of favour. The so-called
Keynesian approach was faulted, not for being
too scientific, but for not being scientific
enough insofar as it conferred causal status on
relationships that lacked autonomy. Lucas
(1976) allowed that the empirically estimated
macroeconomic relations of the Keynesian
approach could have some predictive value,
but only if the policy regime were kept
unchanged. Change the policy regime and
individuals will systematically adjust their
18 Sheetal K. Chand
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the new environment.
9 The macroeconomic
relations of the Keynesian approach estimated
for a given policy regime would cease to be
valid, and now not just for prediction but also
for policy formulation itself. They would give
misleading indications as to how policies
would play out. The issue here concerns the
autonomy of structural relations, which
Haavelmo from the outset insisted should be
of as high a degree as possible so as to facilitate
the analysis of policy changes, etc.10But Lucas
went further when he insisted that the desired
autonomy can only be obtained if the relations
of the macroeconomic model are derived from
rigorous neoclassical micro-foundations – the
so-called deep theory approach, which
attempts to encapsulate individual preferences
in the form of parameters that are invariant to
policy regime changes.
11
At this juncture Keynes would surely have
parted company with Lucas. In keeping with
his behaviouralist views, he would have
rejected Lucas’s deep theory approach and
argued instead for deep psychology. Before we
can accept Lucas’s deep theory as the starting
point, we will need to ascertain whether
human behaviour can, say, be pinned down
in the form of a constant relative risk aversion
(CRRA) expected utility function for a
representative agent that is widely employed
in current neoclassical micro foundations. In
his letter to Roy Harrod Keynes insisted, “I
mentioned before that it (i.e. economics) deals
with motives, expectations, and psychological
uncertainties. One has to be constantly on
guard against treating the material as constant
and homogenous (italics added).” Keynes’s
critique is thus deeper and broader than
Lucas’s critique. Whereas the latter only
applies to macro structural relations, Keynes
critique extends also to micro level
representations such as the representative
agent with a fixed utility preference function.
Psychology is critical for describing,
explaining and hopefully predicting the
behaviour of individuals pursuing their
interests in an uncertain interactive environ-
ment. Many different psychological aspects
are involved aside from those that directly
concern preferences, some of which I list in
the postulate below.12 The tongue-in-cheek
listing provided here attempts to capture the
flavour of Keynes’s behavioural argument and
its macro implications: 
Postulate: In the short-run, uncertain,
confused, misinformed, misguided, anxiety-
ridden, greedy but occasionally inspired
individuals, interacting with each other like a
bunch of manic depressives will generate
uniquely macroeconomic phenomena. From
time to time these could threaten acute
destabilization that overwhelms the automatic
equilibration mechanisms of the economy.
Recovery may eventually take place, but the
human cost could be substantial. Properly
Macroeconomics – which way now? Old versus new styles 19
9. However, in an exhaustive examination of empirical studies, Ericsson and Irons (1995) find very limited 
evidence of Lucas’s critique in the data.
10. Moene and Rødseth (1991) note, “If Haavelmo’s prescriptions had been followed, the now famous Lucas (1976)
critique – that a Phillips curve estimated under one policy regime would break down if the government changed
to another policy rule – might not have been necessary. The Lucas critique is a special case of Haavelmo’s criti-
cism of making policy simulations with relations that do not possess the required degree of autonomy”
11. For a comprehensive discussion of central differences between the approaches employed by Keynes and neo-
classicists see Vercelli (1991).
12. In principle they are measurable, for example using a variety of self reporting scales developed by psychologists.
However, research on how such factors interact with each other to influence decisions is still limited. For some
suggestive research focussing on the manic depressive aspect see Andvig and Moene (1994). 
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policy interventions based on it can help
reduce the human cost.
What role then for neoclassical,
rationalist micro foundations?
If our Keynes based behavioural argument is
correct, there is no role for the traditional
neoclassical micro foundations in a positive
analysis. At best they might indicate what the
individual, on sober reflection, would regard
as the ideal way to make decisions. A general
equilibrium theory based on these premises
can be useful in indicating the nature of the
optimum that would prevail in the absence of
frictions and other distortions. It provides a
counterfactual to the actual state, and can
suggest reasons such as the mode of economic
organization, various frictions and distortions,
and information asymmetries as to why the
counterfactual state’s superior properties are
not being achieved. Furthermore, the
extended analysis within a well understood,
standardized, framework of the implications
of alternative institutional arrangements and
policy changes can be very useful.13 For
example, alternative tax reform packages will
bear different implications for the economy
and social welfare. Examining these in an
idealized model setting with clean lines can
help decision making concerning which of
the reform packages to choose, but with the
strong caveat that the implications derived
may not apply in a real world context.
The lack of realism caveat would also
temper the normative use of the model. It is
often argued that even though the superior
neoclassical organizational mode may not be
feasible, since it is based on assumptions that
can never be fully attained, it provides a
beacon that lights up the direction in which
reforms should move. There is merit to the
argument, but once again it has to be treated
with circumspection. It is too facile to
conclude that because frictions prevent the
attainment of the theoretically highest
optimum, they should all be removed. It
would instead be more appropriate to examine
functions that the frictions fulfil, some of
which could be valuable.14
The following example concerns frictions
that used to exist in many countries between
financial intermediation and the housing
market in the form of heavily regulated
lending. Their effect was to make housing,
which for most people is a long-term invest-
ment, relatively illiquid. From a neoclassical
perspective this is inefficient. There is value in
the properties, which if tapped both releases
resources to add to consumption or
investment and better tailors the investment
and it’s financing to the risk preferences of
households. The logic appears irresistible, and
financial intermediaries who stand to gain
become strong advocates in favour of
elimination. The barriers get removed,
liquidity is improved, speculators are
attracted, property values escalate, and
households engage in more leveraged
borrowing as has happened in many countries
that deregulated.
Suppose next an event causes interest rates
to rise. The neoclassical representative agent
will have done the appropriate inter-temporal
calculations and rationally anticipated such a
possibility. However, myopic, information
constrained, insecure households, fearing a
20 Sheetal K. Chand
13. It can also be good pedagogy.
14. As Haavelmo (1950, p.8) put it “In the final analysis it is, therefore, not a question of whether or not these are
constraints upon the market point but rather a question of how these constraints have come about.” 
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even more than they really could afford. In
this way some of the conditions for a financial
crash are created. It may be that the traditional
firewalls evolved to prevent that sort of
outcome. The firewalls may be inefficient
from a resource allocation perspective and
could be improved upon, but this should not
be done at the expense of the stabilizing
influence they exerted. However, what needs
to be emphasised is that the need for the latter
will not appear evident when you start off
with the neoclassical representation of the
individual. Basu (2003, p.896) put it
succinctly, “If no one is irrational, there can
be no need to protect the irrational”.
Relying on neoclassical priors leads to a
mind-set in which frictions are regarded as
akin to “bad cholesterol” that prevents the
attainment of a superior welfare optimum. If
instead we had a behavioural view of agents
operating in a more realistic setting, we might
find that some of the frictions are in fact
playing the “good cholesterol” role and that
in their absence the outcome could be worse.
Many other examples can be given of how the
indiscriminate elimination of frictions has
resulted in destabilization and systemic
failure, for instance in the former centrally
planned economies, the savings and loans
crises in America, and so forth. The point is
not that inefficient frictions should be
preserved, but that before they are removed
the reasons for their presence should be
established and effective strategies put in place
for containing any risks attendant to their
removal. 
The Right Macroeconomic analysis
for stabilization?
It is now time to bring together the threads of
the methodological review to answer the
question of how macroeconomic analysis
should be undertaken so as to help the
policymaker, especially when confronting
macroeconomic stabilization issues. The
discussion so far reveals that so-called
Keynesian type structural formulations are
inappropriate because they lack autonomy.
Nor is the neoclassical micro foundations
approach for supplying needed autonomy
useful, since it lacks realism.
It is indicative of the limited progress
made that the methodological issues raised
here were addressed much earlier by Frisch.
Andvig (1985) indicates how Frisch’s thinking
underwent profound changes in his concern
to promote superior social outcomes.15 A
starting point would be the Frisch-Tinbergen
approach, and his soon to occur doubts about
the lack of autonomy of the estimated
relations. Frisch proceeded to experiment with
theoretical constructions that would
reproduce empirical observations, and
developed an inspiring formulation of
dynamic processes reminiscent of Wicksell’s
rocking horse. The approach distinguishes
between external shocks that affect the
particular equilibrium of the dynamical
system and its internal dynamics, as given by
its homogenous solution. In this context he
pioneered in developing the technique of
calibration, which has now become an active
tool of research in real business cycle
theorizing. But this too he regarded as
limiting. A given set of empirical observations
could be consistent with many alternative
theories, which would all be more or less
Macroeconomics – which way now? Old versus new styles 21
15. See also Andvig (1988).
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theory that tells an appealing story and
through appropriate calibration ensure its
consistency with the observed facts. But one
could do the same with other theories, and
how should one select amongst them? The
major drawback with the calibrated fitting of
data to a story is that it is a technique that
does not control for any other plausible factors
that are not mentioned in the story but that
may have influenced the data. Calibration
does not appear to provide a sound basis on
which to formulate policy in real time.16
Frisch abandoned calibration and
focussed thereafter entirely on the purposive
nature of macroeconomics in his so-called
decision models. If the intention is to satisfy
the sort of wants noted in Table 1 and promote
overall welfare, priorities must be established.
He believed a social welfare function could be
derived from interviewing policymakers. This
should be maximized subject to a set of
autonomous restrictions that would comprise
definitions, accounting identities, and
technical constraints such as input-output
relations that indicate the feasible production
set for the economy. Following this selection
phase of identifying objectives would be an
implementation phase. Here the economist
would try to figure out how best the objectives
can be met, using a pragmatic approach.
Interaction with policy makers would indicate
which potential instruments were available
and what aspects of behaviour should be
retained or modified. 
What is noteworthy about the decision
model is its limited reliance on behavioural
relations at the outset. These would become
important at the implementation stage but
since they did not have the appropriate degree
of autonomy, would have to be dealt with
flexibly. The availability of adequate
instruments was instead stressed, with success
measured by the ability to meet the welfare
criteria that were set.
17
The proposed use of Frisch’s decision
model is thus analogous in spirit to what
Keynes appears to have had in mind. Once
again, Keynes put it distinctively when he
stated in the General Theory (1936, p. 297),
“The object of our analysis is not to provide a
machine or method of blind manipulation,
which will furnish an infallible answer, but to
provide ourselves with an organised and
orderly method of thinking out particular
problems…” He elaborates further in his
letter to Harrod, “Economics is the science of
thinking in terms of models joined to the art of
choosing models which are relevant to the
contemporary world…The object of a model is
to segregate the semi-permanent or relatively
constant factors from those which are
transitory or fluctuating so as to develop a
logical way of thinking about the latter, and
of understanding the time sequences to which
they give rise to in particular cases (italics
added).” Thus if the problem is to reduce high
unemployment now, and prior analysis has
shown that demand side influences are more
active in the short-run, Keynes’s advice would
be to set aside longer reacting supply side
factors and concentrate instead on quick
acting fluctuations in aggregate demand.  
Following Keynes’s reasoning models
should be kept relatively simple, without very
long causal chains, since the basic behavioural
relations of the model are already likely to
exhibit a high degree of variability, and there
22 Sheetal K. Chand
16. For a perceptive modern critique of the limitations of calibration see Hansen and Heckman (1996). Hoover
(2001) and Sims (1996) also provide critical evaluations.
17. Instruments were abundant in the immediate post-war period in Norway owing to the highly regulated nature
of the economy, but have since declined.
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variability. For instance, empirical analysis
shows that the principal influences on
consumption are income, wealth and the real
interest rate, but their relative effects, which
depend on many other factors, varies.
Attempting to extend the causal net to include
the latter may not lead to much gain in
explanatory power. If the best that can be
hoped for are broad indications of likely
consequences, then it is preferable to generate
these in a transparent, compact model rather
than through a black box formulation. 
A useful model would be based on an
insightful list of causal influences derived from
several different sources: rigorous backward
looking econometric work, real business 
cycle calibrationist models, introspection,
behavioural psychology, informal observation
of macroeconomic aggregates, and anything
else that promotes understanding. This in
essence is Keynes’s approach in the General
Theory. Relying on informal behavioural
micro foundations, he developed a style of
macroeconomic analysis that is looser, more
fluid, and avowedly less similar to the style
widely employed in the natural sciences, or
now enjoined by new classical micro
foundations. The advantage is that it confers
flexibility, which is very useful when dealing
with rapidly changing phenomena as in a
stabilization context. The drawback is the
scope for controversy regarding the
interpretation of the models and their
implications, which has been endless for
Keynes’s General Theory. Formalization is
desirable, but much more research is needed
before this can be done satisfactorily. 18
A simple model built around some
fundamental identities and with a limited
number of broad, transparent, relations
provides a framework that facilitates the
informed discussion of policies to promote
desired outcomes. This in essence is what
Frisch proposed in his decision models. The
fundamental national income accounting
identities provide the model’s skeleton. It can
be articulated to the extent needed to identify
the different type of goods or assets of interest
to the analyst. However, a problem is posed
in integrating the income and product
accounts with the financial accounts and
balance sheets, which may not have been so
important for Frisch given the highly
regulated financial sector then prevailing. This
has to do with the stock-flow problem of
critical importance to the determination of
the model’s dynamic equilibrium. It is
manifest in the IS/LM formulation, where IS
refers to flows per unit of time while LM
concerns balance sheet transactions that hold
at a point in time. Their unsatisfactory
integration in his model gave Hicks a great
deal of concern later in his career. He argued
that the resolution of this problem is critical
to the development of a satisfactory dynamics
of use in policy making. Here, once again, real
business cycle models and other neoclassical
variants that are based on explicit inter-
termporal optimization avoid the problem.
Agents, in maximizing their intertermporal
utility functionals, choose an optimum
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18. Keynes, while an accomplished mathematician, dismissed mathematical formalization in policy-oriented eco-
nomics on the grounds that “…we can keep (verbally) “at the back of our heads” the necessary reserves and qual-
ifications and the adjustments we shall have to make later on, in a way in which we cannot keep complicated
partial differentials “at the back” of several pages of algebra.” (1936, p. 297).   Frisch (1970) shared some of
Keynes concerns, coining the term “playometrics” to refer to the frivolous use of mathematics to derive extended
implications of unrealistic axiomatic systems in economics and provided some telling examples. However, he
remained a very strong proponent of the use of mathematics when done properly.
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whatever stock accumulation profile that
would maximize their intertermporal welfare.
But the automatic reconciliation of stocks and
flows thereby achieved throws out the baby
with the bath water. Balance sheet shocks,
such as extreme housing asset valuations and
their adverse implications for savings flows,
etc are all thrown out.
Keynes’s models, the initial IS/LM
representation and its open economy
Mundell-Fleming extensions (see especially
Mundell, 1968), provide examples of
convenient platforms in the above sense. Such
models are eminently practical. They are based
on simple but powerful insights, which have a
degree of validity under fairly general
conditions. The behavioural relations of the
models are basic and are intended to represent
a fair degree of autonomy, but these are not
immutable. Thus consumption and tax
revenue generally respond to income to a
greater extent than do investment or
government expenditure. A plausible theory
for determining nominal GDP would make
the first two endogenous and the latter two
exogenous. But the assignment could change
if the budget is always balanced and
government expenditure follows revenue, etc.
It is no surprise, therefore, that the flexibility
and realism of such models makes them the
preferred choice in practical policy making.
What they may lack in precision they can
make up through regular monitoring,
modifications and course corrections as
required for promoting the purposive goals.19
A specific example would be the IMF’s
monetary model, which is a pioneering
example of inherent stock-flow dynamics. It
employs the simple insight that a country that
has a balance of payments problem is living
beyond its means. Reducing the balance of
payments deficit will require bringing its
expenditures in line with its income, which
means restricting access to financing. Doing so
through the imposition of bank credit ceilings
will bring about adjustment in the needed
direction. While the monetary model could be
solved mechanically to generate seemingly
precise settings for the control instrument, in
practice the controls are introduced flexibly.20
They are based on detailed negotiations with
the country representatives that take into
account various needs and contingencies. As a
further safeguard, they are subject to frequent
monitoring and the job of improving the
balance of payments gets done. The improve-
ment may not be sustainable, but that is a
different issue.
Practitioners have to use some such
framework. But this particular framework is
too limited. The world has changed, as have
some of its priorities, giving rise to new trade-
offs and concerns, but the model has not been
renewed. How should it be adapted to the
new world of floating exchange rates, the
deregulation of financial markets, or to new
concerns such as restraining the rise in
poverty? Lacking the needed elaboration, the
handling of these additional topics is
necessarily ad hoc, with the result that they
may not even be consistent with the
traditional balance of payments orientation
of IMF credit ceilings in country programs.21
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19. The neoclassical purist will argue that this smacks of fine tuning and is bound to fail. This can only be regarded
as an extreme view since hardly any government will stand by and allow an unstable situation to get out of hand.
20. Although the Polak model provides the underpinnings, the IMF staff use an even simpler formulation built
around a system of interlocking accounts, and in which nominal income is assumed to be exogenously given
(see IMF, 1987).
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direction of providing spuriously rigorous
micro-foundations, since this is unlikely to
improve on the basic insight of the causes of
the balance of payments problem. Un-
fortunately, the needed research does not get
done, because interest has been diverted to a
seemingly much more scientific formulation
of models, and practical policy-making
suffers, with adverse effects on the
community.22 Keynes goes on to remark in
his letter to Harrod, “Good economists are
scarce because the gift for using ‘vigilant
observation’ to choose good models, although
it does not require a highly specialised
technique, appears to be a very rare one.”
Frisch, who had greater faith in econometrics
than did Keynes, echoes the remark when he
states that econometrics is a powerful and
dangerous tool “…it should only be put in
the hands of really first-rate men…” (Cited in
Bjerkholt (1998)).23 The dearth of first rate
men, or women for that matter, and the
enormous demand for economic advice puts
pressure on developing mechanical aids that
will generate the “right” solution. Unfor-
tunately, the nature of the subject and the
current state of the arts does not permit a
convenient “method of blind manipulation”
as Keynes put it. 
Which Way Now?
Predicting future trends of any subject and
even more so for a social science is risky.
Nonetheless, it does seem clear that with the
self-selection of so-called “rocket scientists”,
their considerable self-investments in the
demanding new psuedo-scientific techniques,
and their spread through the ranks of
academia, the disconnect between theoretical
research and practical work will possibly
become even more pronounced. Frisch’s
(1949) remark is apposite, “…we are facing a
race between economic research and economic
facts. It is no exaggeration to say that it is a
race of life and death.” But the situation has a
dynamic. Acute macroeconomic problems will
likely mount, more crises will result and the
IMF’s casualty case list will expand. 
Disillusionment with the current
fashionable tools and conceptual frameworks
may then set in that could lead to a salutary
change in the research agenda, especially with
regard to stabilization policies. This could
result in greater recognition of the unique
nature of macroeconomic phenomena, and
increased work on improving and extending
the scope of basic frameworks such as the
IS/LM and IMF monetary models. The often
heard remark that a piece of macroeconomic
analysis cannot be taken seriously since it lacks
adequate micro foundations would be toned
down. Work on unrealistic micro founda-
tions, especially of the representative agent
type with standard neoclassical utility
functions, would be redirected to more
realistic representations, with more time spent
on analysing the roles played by various
frictions. Above all there would be greater
collaboration with psychologists to develop
behaviour compatible stabilizing institutions
so as to lessen the burden on that rare creature
– Keynes’s hard to find economist.
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21. I have attempted to show in Chand (2003) how the poverty ratio, which can be highly volatile in the short-run,
can be incorporated as an objective of stabilization policy in the IMF model.
22. The distinguished array of chief economists that the IMF has employed in recent years have all been on the 
cutting edge of modern macroeconomic research, which perhaps explains their lack of interest in renovating the
Mundell-Fleming IS/LM open economy model let alone the Polak model. 
23. I will refrain from repeating a remark attributed to Stiglitz about the quality of IMF economists.
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